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ARTIFICIAL MEANING* 
Lawrence B. Solum** 
INTRODUCTION: FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO 
ARTIFICIAL MEANING 
As artificial intelligences (AI) become more powerful and pervasive, 
communication by, with, and among AIs has become a common feature 
of everyday life. Early in the history of AI, there was ELIZA—a simple 
program that utilized simple pattern-matching algorithms to simulate a 
psychotherapist interacting with the user of the program.1 Human 
communication with AIs has been depicted in film and fiction, from the 
iconic confrontation of humans with HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey2 to 
the very human Theodore who falls in love with an artificially intelligent 
operating system named Samantha in Her.3 But complex communication 
with AIs is part of everyday life in modern technological societies, 
including Apple’s Siri, automated telephonic service systems for 
airlines, online ordering systems for merchants like Amazon.com, and 
characters in video games who converse with human players. All of 
these contexts involve artificial meaning, which we can contrast with 
communications by natural persons (human beings)—which we can call 
natural meaning. 
This Essay investigates the concept of artificial meaning, meanings 
produced by entities other than individual natural persons. That 
investigation begins in Part I with a preliminary inquiry in the meaning 
* © 2014 by the author. Permission is hereby granted to make copies in whole or part for scholarly 
or educational use, including copies in electronic form and the distribution of multiple copies. 
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I owe special thanks to Steven Smith, my 
former colleague at the University of San Diego School of Law, for much of the inspiration for this 
Essay. Especially important was Chapter Five of his wonderful book, Law’s Quandary. See STEVEN 
D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 101–25 (2004). 
1. Joseph Weizenbaum, ELIZA—A Computer Program For the Study of Natural Language 
Communication Between Man And Machine, COMM. ACM, Jan. 1966, at 36, 36. 
2. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY 155–56 (1968); 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY 
(MGM 1968). 
3. HER (Annapurna Pictures 2013). 
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of “meaning,” in which the concept of meaning is disambiguated. The 
relevant sense of “meaning” for the purpose of this inquiry is captured 
by the idea of communicative content, although the phrase “linguistic 
meaning” is also a rough equivalent. Part II presents a thought 
experiment, The Chinese Intersection, which investigates the creation of 
artificial meaning produced by an AI that creates legal rules for the 
regulation of a hyper-complex conflux of transportation systems. The 
implications of the thought experiment are explored in Part III, which 
sketches a theory of the production of communicative content by AI. 
Part IV returns to The Chinese Intersection, but Version 2.0 involves a 
twist—after a technological collapse, the AI is replaced by humans 
engaged in massive collaboration to duplicate the functions of the 
complex processes that had formerly governed the flow of automotive, 
bicycle, light-rail, and pedestrian traffic. The second thought experiment 
leads in Part V to an investigation of the production of artificial meaning 
by group agents—artificial persons constituted by rules that govern the 
interaction of natural persons. The payoff of the investigation is 
presented in Part VI. The communicative content created by group 
agents like constitutional conventions, legislatures, and teams of lawyers 
that draft complex transactional documents is artificial meaning, which 
can be contrasted with natural meaning—the communicative content of 
those exceptional legal texts that are produced by a single individual. 
This insight is key to any theory of the interpretation and construction of 
legal texts. A conclusion provides a speculative meditation on the 
implications of the new theory of artificial meaning for some of the great 
debates in legal theory. 
I. MEANING: WHAT AND HOW? 
First the what, then the how. We begin with a general inquiry into the 
meaning of “meaning.” 
A. What Is Meaning? 
This Essay is about meaning, but what does “meaning” mean? The 
word is ambiguous, as illustrated by the following examples: 
• Do you think that those clouds mean it is going to rain? 
• I didn’t mean to hurt your feelings. 
• Do you know how much you mean to me? 
• I got the letter translated! Now, I know what it means. 
The ambiguity of “meaning” afflicts the law as well. When we ask about 
the meaning of a constitutional provision, statute, rule, regulation, or 
judicial opinion, we could be asking about the kind of meaning that 
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translators provide—roughly linguistic meaning, but more precisely 
communicative content. But we might be asking about the implications 
of a text for legal doctrine or for a particular case. Or we might be asking 
about the purpose or function of the text. These are all distinct senses of 
“meaning,” and before we proceed further, we need to sort them out. 
There are at least four senses of “meaning” relevant to legal texts: 
Communicative Meaning. Suppose someone asks a question about 
what the Framers meant by using the phrase “arms” in the Second 
Amendment: were they referring to weapons or the upper limbs of the 
human body? This sense of meaning refers to communicative content—
the content conveyed by the legal text given the context in which it was 
authored. In this Essay, I will use the word “meaning” to refer to this 
sense of meaning, and for greater clarity I will sometimes use the phrase 
“communicative meaning.” 
Legal Meaning. The communicative content of legal text is not the 
same thing as the legal content associated with the text. For example, the 
communicative content of the phrase “freedom of speech” is quite 
sparse, but the legal content associated with the phrase is very rich 
indeed: it encompasses a complex set of doctrines, addressing topics like 
prior restraint, defamation of public officials, and even the regulation of 
billboards. We can call meaning in this sense “legal meaning.” 
Application Meaning. Sometimes when we ask about the “meaning” 
of a legal text, we are asking about the implications that it will have, 
usually in a particular context. For example, we might ask, what does the 
First Amendment freedom of speech mean for my defamation suit? Does 
it provide me a defense? When “meaning” is used in this sense in the 
context of a legal text, we are concerned with the application of the text 
to a particular case or to some set of cases. Let us call this “application 
meaning.” 
Purposive Meaning. Meaning is also used to refer to the purpose or 
motive that produced a particular legal text. For example, we might refer 
to the aim of a constitutional provision by saying, “What did the drafters 
mean to accomplish through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?” We can call this “purposive meaning.” 
So, there are four senses of “meaning” in legal contexts. Our focus 
will be on communicative meaning, but before we begin to explore 
artificial meaning we need to say something about how communicative 
content is produced. 
B. How Is Meaning Produced? 
Theories of meaning are the terrain of the philosophy of language and 
theoretical linguistics, but in a short essay, even a short and dirty tour is 
 
08 - Solum Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2014  2:49 PM 
72 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:69 
impossible. Instead, we will examine one important approach to 
theorizing about theories of meaning. That approach is associated with 
philosopher Paul Grice, but this is a simplified version that differs from 
his account in several ways.4 We can begin with Grice’s idea of 
speaker’s meaning,5 although we will primarily be concerned with legal 
texts, so our version of the idea could more precisely be called “drafter’s 
meaning.” 
We can begin with a definition: 
Speaker’s Meaning: The speaker’s meaning (or utterer’s 
meaning) of an utterance is the illocutionary uptake that the 
speaker intended to produce in the audience on the basis of the 
audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention. 
Quite a mouthful! Grice’s idea is quite general; it can be illustrated 
with an example in which there is neither speech nor text, but 
communication occurs nonetheless: 
Imagine that you have stopped at night at an intersection. The 
driver of another car flashes her lights at you, and you make the 
inference the reason for her doing this is that she wants to cause 
you to believe that your lights are not on. And based on this 
inference, you now do, in fact, realize that your lights are not 
on.6 
Communication succeeds because the other driver recognizes your 
communicative intention. In the language of game theory, you and the 
other driver have common knowledge of this communicative intention. 
Of course, drivers recognize many communicative intentions when they 
are on public roads and highways. In the United States, octagonal red 
“stop” signs communicate a legal command, roughly “halt before 
proceeding.” 
Here is another example, from the California Driver Handbook:7 
4. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989). 
5. See generally H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, 4 
FOUND. LANGUAGE 225 (1968). 
6. This example is a slightly altered version of the thought experiment originally offered by 
Richard Warner. See Richard Warner, Introduction: Grice on Reasons and Rationality, in PAUL 
GRICE, ASPECTS OF REASON ix (2001). 
7. CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, CALIFORNIA DRIVER HANDBOOK 29 (2014), available at 
https://apps.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/dl600.pdf. 
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Traffic signs are a particular kind of legal communication. They convey 
communicative content, and some of them (stop signs, for example) 
have associated legal content. If you run a stop sign, you can get a ticket 
for an offense punished by a fine. 
In conversation, speaker’s meaning can rely on a rich communicative 
context. If Ben and Alice are having a conversation at a coffee house, 
there are multiple channels for producing uptake—the recognition of 
communicative intent. Imagine the following dialog: 
Alice: Another? 
Ben: Black this time. 
Alice: Sugar? [rising inflection] 
Ben [shaking his head from left to right]: Uhhh. 
Alice: OK. 
The communicative content is far richer than the literal meaning of 
Alice and Ben’s utterances. “Another” meant “would you like another 
cup of coffee.” “Black this time” meant “I would like the coffee without 
milk or cream.” “Uhhh” plus the shake meant “I would like the coffee 
without sugar.” If we take away our knowledge of context, the same 
words might mean something totally different. Try your hand at 
inventing different contexts for the same words and you will see what I 
mean. 
Some legal communication occurs in information-rich contexts. Face-
to-face negotiation of an oral contract is a good example. But other legal 
texts are produced in communicative situations that filter information 
about the drafter’s communicative intentions. For example, the original 
United States Constitution was drafted by an exclusive group in a secret 
convention held in Philadelphia,8 and much of the detailed drafting work 
was done by the Committee on Style, a subgroup that did its work away 
from the main convention.9 How does this kind of communication 
8. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1115 (2003). 
9. Id. at 1206–07. 
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work? How can groups form communicative intentions? And how do the 
readers of such texts grasp these intentions? These questions are so hard 
that it is difficult to see how we can approach them. This Essay explores 
an unorthodox route to an understanding of the production of 
communicative content in legal texts drafted and promulgated by 
complexly structured groups. That exploration begins with a thought 
experiment. 
II. THE CHINESE INTERSECTION, VERSION 1.0 
Imagine that you are in the not-so-distant future, looking back at the 
history of traffic management in Shanghai, an urban megalopolis that we 
shall imagine became even larger and more densely populated. 
Somewhere in the heart of this imaginary version of Shanghai there was 
a supremely complicated intersection, where ten major roads, three 
highways, six surface light rail lines, and twenty-three pedestrian 
walkways intersect. Traffic engineers and the city officials tried all the 
usual tools to manage the intersection. Stoplights, left-turn-only lanes, 
pedestrian walk/don’t-walk signs, speed limits, don’t-block-the-box 
signs with big fines, and so forth. None of it did any good. The “Chinese 
Intersection” as we shall call it was the source of traffic jams of epic 
proportions—get stuck at the wrong place at the wrong time, and your 
five-hour commute lasted for five days. Literally. 
At some point, the officials realized that human beings just weren’t up 
to the task of managing traffic in the Chinese Intersection. For every 
move the human regulators made, frustrated drivers had a 
countermove—always attempting to circumvent the rules in order to 
shave a few minutes off the journey through the Chinese Intersection. 
Economists wrote articles that explained that driver behavior can be 
modeled using the techniques of game theory. The Chinese Intersection, 
the economists said, involved multiple Prisoner’s Dilemmas. If every 
driver obeyed the rules, then each individual driver would benefit, but no 
driver could trust the others, so almost everyone cheated, and the result 
was chaos. Other economists calculated the effects of the Chinese 
Intersection on productivity, transportation costs, and real estate values. 
Everyone knew that the number would be a big one, but when the results 
of the study were announced, it precipitated a political crisis. The 
Chinese Intersection imposed annual costs of close to 1.6 trillion Yuan 
(or approximately 100 billion dollars). 
The good news was that the budget for solving the problem became 
functionally unlimited. Tasks forces met. Entrepreneurs proposed 
solutions. Politicians called for immediate action. The obvious solution 
was to eliminate the Chinese Intersection altogether—perhaps a nice 
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park could replace it. But then a simulation was run, and it turned out 
that this would make the traffic problems in Shanghai far worse. 
Eventually, a solution was proposed. Traffic in the Chinese Intersection 
(and eventually all of Shanghai) would be managed by an AI that would 
operate a system of traffic controls. The system would operate a massive 
system of programmable lane markers, signs, signals, gates, bumps, 
broadcasts, robot vehicles, and vehicle removal cranes. The goal was to 
create a system that would write the traffic laws, inform drivers of their 
contents, and then enforce the laws by removing noncomplying vehicles 
and collecting on-the-spot fines from the drivers. 
And so a team of programmers and traffic engineers began the 
process of developing the Shanghai Artificially Intelligent Traffic 
Authority (SAITA). Early on in the process, the developers realized that 
SAITA would need the capacity to adapt itself to changes in driver 
behavior and traffic flow. The programmers produced a system that was 
capable of changing the traffic code, speed limits, signage, and lane 
configurations—just about every element of traffic regulation in the city. 
The system was designed to introduce random variations and run 
controlled experiments to evaluate the effects of various combinations 
on traffic patterns. Violations would be detected by an elaborate system 
of electronic surveillance. Offenders were identified and immediately 
would be removed from traffic by a system of cranes located at key 
intersections. An automated adjudication system imposed fines for 
minor offenses and jail terms for more serious violations. 
The rollout of the new system was not great. There were bugs and for 
several days, traffic actually became much worse. SAITA produced a 
variety of legal texts, signs, and symbols. For example, SAITA 
periodically revised the punishments associated with traffic code 
violations—optimizing the level of punishment by modeling the costs 
and benefits in light of the massive amounts of data it collected on driver 
behavior. SAITA operated the complex system of traffic signs. In the 
early days, these signs were simply electronic versions of the familiar 
signs: 
But as the system introduced random mutations, the signs began to 
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morph as the system learned new techniques for communicating with 
drivers. Running a static stop sign resulted in a fine of ¥2000, but if the 
stop sign was flashing, the fine increased to ¥5000 and if the stop sign 
was flashing, spinning, and cycling from red to orange and purple, then 
the fine increased to ¥10,000. The system was even capable of 
introducing its own vocabulary. When the AI detected a new violation 
type that had a particularly harmful effect on traffic flow, it could invent 
a word (represented by a logogram or character) to name the type and 
add a provision to the traffic code. SAITA could even initiate a public 
information campaign with entertaining YouTube videos and giant 
billboards defining the new word and instructing the public about the 
new law. 
SAITA’s ability to create new words was put to use when the system 
noticed that particularly aggressive drivers would pull off the street and 
onto the sidewalk to circumvent particularly bad traffic. SAITA 
experimented with several different words and logograms to 
communicate a new traffic code provision that imposed a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ninety days in jail for this behavior—finally 
settling on a neologism that would literally translate into English as 
“dogging.” Why “dogging”? SAITA had posted an animated video that 
portrayed a car driving on a sidewalk as a snarling, aggressive dog. 
Programmed to monitor the comments to its video, SAITA observed that 
“dog” was the most common word and then experimented with several 
variations. “Dogging” was most effective, and once the data revealed 
that “No Dogging” signs worked, SAITA added a “No-Dogging” 
provision to the traffic code. 
Traffic improved noticeably, even in the first few weeks, but as the 
system began to learn from experience, the effects became dramatic. 
Lanes were adjusted for traffic flow, the laws were optimized, and the 
system did a much better job of communicating with drivers than the old 
human-run system had ever done. Within two years, the traffic flowed 
smoothly through the Chinese Intersection. Commute times went down, 
happiness levels went up, and there were even calls to extend SAITA’s 
domain to regulation of things other than traffic. 
What accounted for the success of SAITA? An obvious factor was 
that SAITA used sophisticated algorithms to adjust traffic patterns—
two-way streets could become one-way thoroughfares, a through-lane of 
traffic could become a dedicated left-turn lane, speed limits could be 
adjusted—and these adjustments were made dynamically in real time in 
response to the number of vehicles, their destinations, and so forth. But 
there was another factor: SAITA was supremely good at communicating 
traffic rules to drivers. Why? Because SAITA was able to determine 
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whether its efforts to communicate were working. If SAITA changed the 
law, but driver behavior did not respond, SAITA would try another form 
of communication, again and again, until the message was getting 
across. 
* * * 
A Digression on the Role of Thought Experiments in Legal Theory 
 
Legal theorists live and die by the hypothetical—the particularly legal 
version of the thought experiment. We use thought experiments as 
intuition pumps—the hypothetical is designed to provoke (or “pump”) 
an intuition or reaction. A well-constructed legal hypothetical elicits 
intuitions about what should be done, and these intuitions can then be 
used to critique existing rules or to show that rules are justified. Thought 
experiments can be used to pump other kinds of intuitions as well. I am 
about to use the Chinese Intersection to pump some intuitions about 
meaning—the way it works and how it comes to be. I am going to 
attempt to show you that some of the things you may believe about the 
production of meaningful legal texts are not quite right. But you should 
be on your guard. Accidental features of the setup might produce the 
intuitions pumped by the Chinese Intersection thought experiment. 
Although the Chinese Intersection tells a story that seems plausible—we 
can imagine something like SAITA might become possible in the not-too-
distant future—skepticism is appropriate. Is this science fiction doing 
illegitimate work? 
* * * 
III. THE PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT BY 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCES 
SAITA would be an AI and the meanings it would produce would be 
artificial meanings. But is this even possible? Isn’t meaning a function of 
intentions? And aren’t intentions mental states? And don’t mental states 
require a mind? SAITA would just be a machine. Doesn’t it follow that 
SAITA couldn’t have a mind? And lacking a mind, doesn’t it follow that 
SAITA could not produce meanings? So if there are meanings in the 
thought experiment, they must be produced by human individuals—
perhaps the programmers or the working groups that gave the 
programmers their instructions. “Artificial meanings” must be a fiction, 
“transcendental nonsense,” as it were—the real meanings must always 
be natural meanings, produced by natural persons. 
The attitude conveyed by the rhetorical questions in the immediately 
prior paragraph is skepticism about artificial meaning. In this Part of the 
Essay, we will investigate that skepticism. In the end I hope to convince 
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you that such skepticism is unwarranted and that artificial meanings are 
both conceivable and possible. Let’s begin with what I think is the root 
of the skepticism—a view that we shall call the “folk theory of 
meaning.” 
Here is a picture of meaning—communicative meaning that is. 
Meaning begins in our minds—in our heads, so to speak. We have a 
thought or idea. We then encode that thought in some medium of 
communication—usually a natural language like English, but creative 
beings that we are, we can use other techniques—like flashing our 
headlights or making a gesture. Someone else, a listener or reader, then 
receives the encoded message. They hear what we say or read what we 
wrote. Then they decode the message. If they do that successfully, then 
they will have a thought or idea that is identical to the one we had. 
The folk theory of meaning seems quite plausible on the surface. We 
sometimes talk in ways that seem to presuppose this theory. “You get 
my idea, don’t you?” Or perhaps, “we are on the same wavelength.” 
“You really understand me. It’s like you are reading my mind.” If the 
folk theory were true, it would create serious problems for the Chinese 
Intersection thought experiment. SAITA would not have conscious 
experiences. SAITA has no head and so there can be no thoughts in the 
head that SAITA lacks. So SAITA would not be encoding its thoughts, 
and if it couldn’t encode its thoughts, then we couldn’t decode them! If 
the folk theory of meaning were true, then whatever SAITA would be 
doing, it would not be communicating. The legal code that SAITA wrote 
would be meaningless. The traffic signs and lane markings it produced 
would be gibberish. No mind, no meaning. 
So if we accept that the folk theory of meaning is correct, then SAITA 
could not produce communicative content. But the Chinese Intersection 
experiment seems to elicit strong intuitions to the contrary! So either the 
folk theory of meaning is false, or its defenders must produce some 
explanation that accounts for meaning in the Chinese Intersection 
thought experiment. The most obvious line of reply is to try to show that 
what appears to be artificial meaning is actually natural meaning 
(meaning produced by natural persons) in disguise. 
How could we argue that artificial meaning reduces to natural 
meaning? The obvious move is to locate the meaning in the heads of the 
programmers or those who gave the programmers their instructions. 
When SAITA uses the word “stop,” the meaning comes from the 
programmer who added the word “stop” to the traffic vocabulary module 
in SAITA’s vocabulary. Consider ELIZA, the primitive AI that 
simulated a psychotherapist. In ELIZA’s case, it seems plausible that all 
of the sentences produced by ELIZA have meanings that are reducible to 
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meanings produced by natural persons. Some of the meaning was 
produced by Joseph Weizenbaum, who wrote the program. Likewise, 
some of the meaning was produced by the users of ELIZA, because 
things they said could be incorporated in ELIZA’s responses. But all of 
the meanings produced by ELIZA can be reduced to meanings produced 
by natural persons. 
Of course, SAITA is more complex than ELIZA—by several orders 
of magnitude. There were many programmers and many others, 
individuals and committees of individuals, giving instructions to the 
programmers. But in the end, the argument would go, all of the meaning 
produced by SAITA could be traced back to meanings produced by 
natural persons. SAITA’s traffic code is a complex concatenation of 
meanings that began as thoughts or ideas in the heads of thousands of 
individuals. The reason that SAITA can communicate is that drivers are 
able to decode the logograms and symbols that SAITA’s algorithms used 
to encode the mental states of the programmers who created SAITA. 
But the folk theory of meaning cannot account for SAITA’s behavior 
or the reactions of drivers and pedestrians to the things SAITA does. 
This is because SAITA goes beyond repeating and recombining 
expressions provided by its programmers. In the dogging example, 
SAITA actually recognizes a new type or kind of behavior and then 
coins a new word to represent the new concept. None of the 
programmers who wrote SAITA’s code knew anything about dogging 
(the concept) and none of them knew the meaning of “dogging” (the 
word). “Dogging” has artificial meaning—meaning created by an AI that 
cannot be reduced to meanings created by natural persons. 
“Dogging” was built into the thought experiment to make it clear that 
artificial meaning cannot always be reduced to natural meaning. The 
thought experiment reveals the possibility that artificial meanings could 
be brought into the world by something other than a natural person. It is 
true that SAITA itself was created by humans. The important feature of 
the thought experiment is not that SAITA would be independent of 
natural human persons—it would depend on humans for its very 
existence. The important thing is that SAITA’s meanings are not 
reducible to meanings produced by natural human persons. Dependence 
is one thing; reduction is quite another. 
This point does not rely on the “dogging” example. It would still be 
the case that SAITA could create artificial meanings, not reducible to 
natural meanings, even if SAITA’s vocabulary was limited to words and 
phrases whose invention was traceable to natural persons. Even if 
SAITA’s vocabulary were entirely composed of words that were already 
present in its program, SAITA would create artificial meanings if it 
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could combine these words in new ways. In fact, this is also how natural 
persons create new expressions. Ordinarily, we do not coin new words 
when we communicate. We combine words we borrow from others in 
new ways—just as I am doing now in writing this article. The fact that 
my words are borrowed from others does not entail the conclusion that 
other people produced the meaning of this article. That conclusion is 
obviously false. Just as natural persons create new meanings through 
novel combinations of words, so too can we imagine that SAITA might 
do so. 
The folk theory of meaning is based on the premise that meanings are 
necessarily “in the heads” of natural persons. The assumption is that 
meaning is a mental event that occurs in the mind of the speaker or 
author. That meaning is then encoded into language—something said 
orally or written down in a text. If that were true, then SAITA couldn’t 
produce meaning, because SAITA doesn’t have a mind of its own—it is 
just a computer program. SAITA (by hypothesis) is not conscious; it has 
no self-awareness. So if SAITA does produce meanings, that is, the 
various directives that enable the Chinese Intersection to function 
smoothly, then it has to be the case that we can have meanings that are 
produced artificially, by entities that are not conscious natural persons. 
IV. AFTER THE APOCALYPSE: THE CHINESE INTERSECTION, 
VERSION 2.0 
Here is another thought experiment. Suppose that the SAITA were 
destroyed or disabled by some calamity. Perhaps a particularly 
destructive computer virus infects SAITA and the technical support staff 
is unable to repair the program. Of course, the immediate effect of this 
calamity is chaos at the Chinese Intersection; once again, automobile 
traffic in Shanghai is paralyzed. Suppose that the traffic officials respond 
to this calamity by using human beings to replace SAITA. 
In the immediate aftermath of SAITA’s demise, the traffic officials 
decide to appoint a traffic czar. One official is given responsibility for 
making all the decisions about the various traffic signals. The traffic czar 
is tasked with the job of rewriting the traffic regulations in response to 
changing conditions. But it turns out that the traffic czar is simply unable 
to keep up with the complexity of the problem. The czar cannot keep up 
with the massive flow of information from the human traffic spotters 
who take the place of SAITA’s electronic monitors. The czar attempts to 
revise the traffic code in response to new problems, but that job is too 
big for one individual. Either the czar falls behind, unable to produce 
well drafted regulations at the required pace, or, even worse, the czar 
does keep up, but writes regulations that are confusing, ambiguous, and 
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have unintended consequences. Under the czar, the Chinese Intersection 
is a complete mess—worse than the “bad old days” before SAITA. 
So the czar is replaced. City officials assemble a team of 
programmers and managers who analyze the code that produced 
SAITA’s operation, and give teams of human beings responsibility for 
performing the roles that various modules of the SAITA program 
performed. Of course, the new system is not as efficient as SAITA. 
Electronic monitoring of the Chinese Intersection is replaced by human 
observers. The system of electronic signs is replaced by hand-painted 
signs. SAITA’s almost instantaneous response to traffic problems is not 
matched, but the humans who implement the routines and algorithms in 
SAITA’s programs are able to do a pretty good job. Like SAITA, they 
implement new traffic rules in response to changing conditions. 
Experience with the traffic czar had demonstrated that a single 
individual could not duplicate SAITA’s operation. Instead, the work of 
monitoring traffic, producing traffic signs, and creating new traffic rules 
is distributed among several large teams of human beings. Spotters 
produce reports on the behavior of the various vehicles, trains, and 
pedestrians. Another group analyzes the reports and routes them to 
teams that control the traffic signals and lane gates. These teams issue 
commands to runners who post new signs and open and close the various 
gates. 
Like SAITA, the new system was capable of producing new traffic 
rules. Instead of assigning the work of drafting to a czar, the job of 
writing the rules was broken down into subtasks. One group worked on 
developing descriptions of prohibited behavior. Another group 
developed a system of sanctions. Yet another group monitored the 
effects of the sanctions and implemented an algorithm for adjusting the 
penalties to optimize traffic flow. 
No one individual drafted the traffic code. Indeed, no one individual 
reviews the whole text of new regulations as they are produced. Instead, 
different sections are produced by different teams and assembled by 
other groups. The assembled regulations are then considered by another 
group (the Regulation Committee), which operates by majority vote, 
either approving the regulation, rejecting it, or sending it back for 
additional work by the drafting and assembly teams. The Regulation 
Committee consists of senior-level managers who have multiple 
responsibilities. It turns out that it is quite rare for each and every 
individual member of the team to read the whole text of a new 
regulation. Indeed, many regulations are approved on the basis of 
executive summaries that are read by the assistants to the team members. 
It is not uncommon for the final text to be approved without any one 
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individual having read the whole text. The creation of the meaning of 
new traffic regulations is a group effort. 
This new system for generating traffic regulations is the Group Agent 
for Shanghai Traffic (GAST). The regulations that GAST produces have 
communicative content. When a new regulation is promulgated by 
GAST, the rules are posted on large billboards and enforced by human 
traffic police officers. The rules are applied by human traffic judges, 
although the human judges are not quite as accurate as SAITA had been. 
SAITA worked because it was a very good communicator. It was able 
to formulate rules and regulations that were understood by drivers and 
pedestrians. GAST may not have been quite as good at communicating 
as SAITA, but it was good enough. The humans who implemented 
SAITA’s algorithms were not as fast as SAITA, but they were able to 
produce a workable system of traffic regulation. Traffic flowed at a 
reasonable pace through the Chinese Intersection—slower and with 
more frequent interruptions because of accidents, but still much better 
than the “bad old days” and much, much better than the brief regime of 
the traffic czar. 
V. THE PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT BY 
GROUPS 
What are the lessons of the Chinese Intersection, Version 2.0, for our 
understanding of legal communication? Recall that the folk theory of 
meaning is based on the assumption that meanings are a function of the 
mental states of individual human minds. That theory was unable to 
accommodate successful communication by an AI. SAITA produced 
meanings without mental states. Similarly, the folk theory of meaning 
has difficulty with meanings that are produced by groups rather than 
individuals. If meanings just are the encoded and decoded mental states 
of individuals, then it follows that the notion of “group meaning” is 
incoherent. Groups do not have mental states or minds, and therefore the 
very idea of a group meaning would be incoherent. Instead, the folk 
theory must postulate that apparent group meanings are actually 
meanings produced by individual natural persons. So folk theory 
requires that the meanings produced by GAST must actually be 
assemblages of meanings by the individual members of the teams that 
make up GAST. 
But it turns out that the folk theory of meaning is simply unable to 
account for the way that GAST actually works. GAST’s procedures for 
the production of legal texts were modeled on the algorithms used by 
SAITA. Although fragments of legal texts correspond to the mental 
states of team members, the meaning of the text as a whole does not 
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correspond to the mental states of any one individual. Just as SAITA 
could produce meanings without mental states, so too could GAST 
produce a meaningful traffic regulation with content that never was “in 
the head” of any single individual. 
Importantly, the communicative content of the various sections of the 
traffic code did not correspond to the mental states of the members of 
GAST’s Regulation Committee. Some Committee Members voted for 
regulations on the advice of staffers. Others read summaries. And some 
members even read some of the sections of the regulations. But it was 
very rare indeed for a Regulation Committee member to read the whole 
text of a new regulation. Given these circumstances, no one could think 
that the meaning of the regulations could be understood as 
corresponding to the mental states of the members. Those mental states 
simply did not exist. Rather, GAST produced meaning in much the same 
way that SAITA did—through a complex algorithmic process. Of 
course, SAITA functioned without human parts, whereas GAST 
operated through the actions of individual human agents. But so far as 
meaning was concerned, GAST and SAITA were essentially identical—
they operated on the basis of complex rules that were produced by 
testing the effect of various regulations on traffic flow. 
VI. NATURAL MEANING AND ARTIFICIAL MEANING 
Consider again the distinction between natural meaning and artificial 
meaning. We are using these two phrases in stipulated senses. “Natural 
meaning” is meaning produced by a natural person. The folk theory of 
meaning seems capable of accounting for natural meaning, because 
natural persons have mental states and their use of language can be 
explained by the role that their mental states play in the production of 
their speech and writing. 
“Artificial meaning” is meaning produced by entities that are not 
natural persons. One example of artificial meaning is provided by 
communications that are generated by AIs. Today, such meanings are 
produced by the complex algorithms that produce the various texts 
generated by Amazon.com or Siri. Even today, these AIs produce 
meanings that cannot be reduced to the meaning generated by the 
programmers (and others) who have input into the texts produced by 
Amazon.com or the oral communications generated by Siri. These AIs 
say new things because their algorithms combine words into sentences 
that have never been uttered before. 
Artificial meanings can be produced by AIs, but there is another 
common source of non-natural meaning. Artificial meanings can be 
produced by groups. In Version 2.0 of the Chinese Intersection thought 
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experiment, GAST was modeled on the algorithmic processes of an AI. 
In the actual world, the groups that produce artificial meanings are 
frequently what the law calls “artificial persons.” Such artificial persons 
include business corporations, municipal corporations, school districts, 
state governments, and the governments of nation states. 
These artificial persons speak and write. Sometimes, the 
communications produced by an artificial person are identical to the 
communications of a single natural person who acts on behalf of the 
group. In an absolute monarchy, the king or queen might speak on behalf 
of the nation state. But in complex modern societies, it is frequently the 
case that the communications of artificial persons are produced by group 
agents. Thus, the text of a contract entered into by a corporation may be 
drafted by a committee of employees and approved by another group of 
managers. The text of a municipal ordinance may be drafted by a 
committee of staffers, modified by a subcommittee of the city council, 
and approved by a majority vote of the council as a whole. The text of a 
federal statute may be drafted by an industry group, modified by the 
staff of a congressional committee, modified again in a committee 
markup session, and then approved by a complex process of committee 
votes, votes of the House and Senate, and finally signature by the 
President. 
VII. LEGAL MEANING AS ARTIFICIAL MEANING 
And this brings us to the law. In the usual cases, legal meaning is 
produced by group agents. Constitutions, statutes, regulations, 
ordinances, rules of procedure, and even judicial opinions are usually 
group efforts. There are exceptions. The meaning of a single judge’s 
ruling from the bench is a natural meaning—produced by a single 
natural person through the operation of that natural person’s mental 
states. And some judges write their own opinions or simply sign off on 
opinions that are the work product of a single law clerk. But these are 
the exceptions that prove the rule. Most legal communications and 
almost every constitution and statute are produced by group agents. 
Teams of lawyers write contracts. Teams of legislative staffers (or 
lobbyists) write statutes ratified by a complex system of voting rules. 
Constitutions are written by special conventions or parliamentary 
committees. The law is full of artificial meaning. 
Legal interpretation is (usually) the parsing of artificial meanings. 
Grasping these meanings is not a matter of inferring the mental states of 
a particular individual or group of individuals. When it comes to group 
agents, mental states play a role in the production of artificial meanings, 
but the meanings themselves cannot be reduced to those mental states. 
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The fact of irreducibility is demonstrated by the Chinese Intersection 
thought experiment. Version 1.0 shows that we can have meanings 
without mental states. Version 2.0 shows that a group agent can produce 
meanings that do not correspond to the mental states of the individuals 
who make up the group. 
The Chinese Intersection Versions 1.0 and 2.0 are just thought 
experiments. SAITA and GAST are fiction, not fact. But group agents 
are fact and not fiction. Complex artificial persons like Congress or 
Microsoft produce artificial meanings in the real world. They are able to 
do this because their actions are structured by complex rules that enable 
many individuals to produce texts to communicate effectively, even if 
there is no single individual who intended that communicative effect. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that artificial meanings will be good 
meanings. The complex group processes that produce a statute might 
produce a well-functioning regulatory regime, but they might also 
produce a text with obscure, ambiguous, and seemingly contradictory 
provisions. Some statutes work; others fail. But this is also true of 
natural meanings. Natural persons are just human beings. Some of us 
write clearly, others obscurely. Given the complexity of modern law, 
reliance on artificial persons to produce legal meaning seems inevitable. 
The Internal Revenue Code and the associated regulations operate as a 
complex structured whole, but no human being could possibly produce 
that text in a single lifetime—and even if that were theoretically 
possible, no one thinks that wholesale reform of the Code would best be 
accomplished by a single author. 
CONCLUSION: THE ARTIFICIAL MEANING OF THE LAW 
Today, the artificial meaning of the law is produced by group agents, 
and these groups are composed of natural persons. This is a familiar 
state of affairs, although it gives rise to a well-known set of problems in 
the theory of legal interpretation. We debate about the original intentions 
of the framers. Some legal theorists argue that the framers’ intentions 
cannot provide the meaning of the constitutional text, because different 
framers had different mental states. Similar arguments are made about 
the intent of Congress and the meaning of federal statutes. The problems 
are well-known, but they are not insurmountable. Group agents 
communicate successfully. Our puzzlement about group intentions does 
not translate into an inability to grasp the artificial meaning of the texts 
produced by group agents. 
Perhaps not tomorrow, but someday, we may face similar problems 
with the interpretation of legal texts that are produced by AIs rather than 
group agents. We cannot yet imagine a plausible scenario where the 
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Constitution of the United States is replaced by a text written by an AI. 
But we can imagine the drafting of contracts, wills, and trust instruments 
by AIs. If the AIs are well designed, the legal texts they write will have 
clear but artificial meanings. Indeed, we can imagine a day when 
contracts written by AIs are generally regarded as better than those 
written by natural persons. The AIs might do a better job than humans of 
avoiding unintended consequences and accidental ambiguities. When we 
read these texts, we will inevitably rely on familiar tools. We will 
assume that words are intended in their ordinary senses (conventional 
semantic meanings) and that standard forms of grammar and syntax are 
employed. We will not be tempted to search for idiosyncratic meanings 
that reflect the mental state of the drafters—because we will know that 
these mental states simply do not exist. 
Indeed, the interpretation of artificial legal meanings produced by AIs 
is already occurring in small but significant ways. Online orders may 
create binding contracts, and some of the terms of some of these 
contracts are generated by AIs. Thus, the pricing of airline fares by 
algorithms (rather than humans) already provides part of a legally 
binding agreement. We have no difficulty understanding these terms—
even though they do not reflect the mental states of a human being. 
As time goes on, it seems likely that the proportion of legal content 
provided by AIs will grow in a fairly organic and gradual way. Indeed, 
the first time a human signs a contract that was generated in its entirety 
by an AI, the event might even escape our notice. It seems quite likely 
that our parsing of artificial meanings generated by AIs will simply be 
taken for granted. This will be no accident. Today, our social world is 
permeated by artificial legal meanings. Indeed, we can already begin to 
imagine a world in which the notion of a legal text authored by a single 
natural person begins to seem strange or antiquated. 
Our world is already inhabited by AIs. Our law is already composed 
of artificial meanings. The twain shall meet. 
 
 
